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THE MARITAL DEDUCTION
MARTIN L. FRIED
Prior to 1942, the estate of a married individual dying a resident of
a community property state suffered a lesser burden by reason of the
imposition of federal estate taxes than did the estate of a resident of a
common law state, even though, in each case, the estate may have
been amassed solely through the efforts of the decedent. An attempt
to redress this discrimination by taxing community property much
in the manner of joint property met with objections from the com-
munity property states. In response to these complaints, Congress, in
1948, repealed the scheme of taxing community property it had
adopted only six years earlier and sought to achieve equality of treat-
ment by enacting the marital deduction,
The Deduction in Brief
Section 2056(a) of the Internal Revenue Code' grants a decedent
the privilege of a tax-free transfer to his or her spouse of up to one-
half of the decedent's estate. Although the availability of the deduc-
tion is conditioned upon meeting the terms of the statute, the pro-
vision is mandatory, not elective. In other words, an executor may
not waive the marital deduction even though its application proves
detrimental rather than beneficial.2 (Avoidance of the deduction
would be advisable where the two spouses died within a short time
of each other. Waiver of the deduction would produce a higher tax
in the first estate, but might make available to the second estate a credit
for prior taxes of such magnitude that the combined taxes paid by the
two estates would be less than would be achieved by the normal
pattern of claiming a deduction in the first estate and being taxed in
full in the second.)
To qualify for the deduction:
(1) The decedent must have been a resident or citizen of the
United States at the time of his death. No deduction is allowed
to the estate of a nonresident alien unless a treaty or tax con-
vention provides otherwise.3
(2) The decedent must have been survived by a spouse. 4
1 All statutory references are to provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
2 Rev. Rul. 59-123, 1949-1C.B.248.
8 Reg. § 20.2056(a)-l (a) (1958).
4 Whether or not the surviving spouse is a nonresident alien is of no moment.
What is important is that the survivor be the decedent's spouse at the date of
death. S. Rep. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 2, 6, 7 (1948). And for this
purpose, the marital relationship is not terminated by either a legal separation or
a nonfinal interlocutory decree of divorce. Cf. Marriner S. Eccles, 19 T.C. 1049
(1953), aff'd 208 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1953).
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(3) An interest in property must pass from the decedent to the
surviving spouse.
(4) The interest must be a deductible interest.
Interests Passing to the Surviving Spouse
Subject to the limitation that the maximum marital deduction can-
not exceed fifty percent of the value of the adjusted gross estate, an
estate is allowed a deduction for the value of any interest in property
that passes from the decedent to the surviving spouse. In this regard,
interests may pass by will or intestacy, by operation of law or by
reason of inter vivos transactions in which property finds its way
into the hands of the spouse, but no deduction may be had unless the
interest is included in the decedent's gross estate. The discussion that
follows will investigate the concept of "passing" in more detail. In so
doing, it will refer to the decedent and the surviving spouse. However,
it should be noted that the applicable provision, Section 2056(e), serves
also to define when an interest passes to a person other than the
surviving spouse.
Property Acquired by Will or Inheritance
Pursuant to the first two paragraphs of Section 2056(e), an interest
is deemed to pass from a decedent to the surviving spouse if obtained
by way of bequest or devise or inheritance. The disposition need not
be outright. A testamentary gift of a remainder to the spouse follow-
ing a life estate in another qualifies to the extent of the remainder;
a gift to the spouse of a life interest with remainder to his or her
estate likewise qualifies, but in this instance the entire property is
treated as passing from the decedent to the spouse.5
Interests acquired by the spouse as the result of a controversy in-
volving the decedent's will are regarded as passing to the surviving
spouse "if the assignment or surrender [of the interest to the spouse]
was a bona fide recognition of enforceable rights of the surviving
spouse in the decedent's estate." 6 According to the Regulations, such
a bona fide recognition requires a decision of a local court upon the
merits in an adversary proceeding following a genuine and active
contest.7 The Regulations go on to say that decrees rendered by
consent or pursuant to an agreement not to contest will not neces-
sarily be accepted as a bona fide evaluation of the rights of the spouse.8
Presumably the existence of a valid claim on the part of the surviving
spouse will suffice to qualify interests passing to the spouse pursuant to
the settlement of a will contest.
5 Reg. S 20.2056(e)-2(b) (2) (i), (ii) (1958).
6 Reg. S 20.2056(e)-2(d) (2) (1958).
7id.
8 d.
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Dower or Curtesy
A spouse's dower or curtesy interest or any statutory interest in
lieu thereof constitutes an interest in property passing to the surviving
spouse.9 By ruling, the Service takes the position that payments made
by an estate pursuant to an antenuptial agreement waiving dower
qualify as well.10
If the spouse elects to take benefits granted under the decedent's will
and thereby to relinquish dower, the interest taken under the will is
the one that is treated as having passed to the surviving spouse; the
relinquished dower interest is not. Conversely, where an election is
made against the will, the property dispositions made for the benefit
of the surviving spouse do not pass to the spouse, but the elected
share or interest does.12
Lifetime Transfers
By virtue of Section 2056(e) (4), an interest can pass to the surviving
spouse even though it was the subject of an inter vivos transfer from
the decedent to the spouse.13 As we have seen deduction is condi-
tioned upon the interest being included in the decedent's gross estate.
Thus, a gift found to be in contemplation of death would qualify for
the marital deduction; one made more than three years prior to death
would not.
Joint Property
Property held by the decedent and the surviving spouse as joint
tenants with right of survivorship or as tenants by the entirety passes
from the decedent to the spouse under the provisions of Section
2056(e)(5). The degree to which the property qualifies for the
deduction depends on the extent to which the interest was includible
in the decedent's gross estate under Section 2040.
Interests Subject to Powers of Appointment
Interests appointed to the surviving spouse pursuant to the exercise
by the decedent of a general power of appointment are considered
to pass to the spouse from the decedent.14 The same is true as to
interests which the spouse takes in default on the release or nonexer-
cise of the power. Although an interest can pass to the spouse through
9 S 2056(e) (3). This assumes that the interest is not a terminable interest.10 Rev. Rul. 68-271, 1968-1C.B. 409.
11 Reg. S 20.2056(e)-2 (c) (1958).
1l Id.
13 The spouse must receive the beneficial interest in the property. A transfer
to the spouse merely as trustee or subject to a binding agreement by the spouse
to dispose of the interest in favor of a third person cannot be counted as an
interest passing to the spouse.
14 S 2056(e) (6).
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the exercise or nonexercise of a special power, such interests do not
qualify for the deduction inasmuch as the property subject to the
power is not includible in the decedent's gross estate.15
Insurance Proceeds
The final paragraph of Section 2056(e) treats proceeds of insurance
upon the life of the decedent as passing to the person who receives
them.16 If this be the spouse, then the proceeds count for the marital
deduction, provided, of course, the proceeds form a part of the
decedent's gross estate pursuant to Section 2042.
Disclaimer and the "Passing" Requirement
A disclaimer by the surviving spouse of an interest that would
otherwise be deemed to have passed from decedent to spouse becomes
an interest that is considered to pass to the persons entitled to receive
the interest as a result of the disclaimer. 17 By the same token, if, by
reason of a disclaimer by a third person, the surviving spouse receives
the disclaimed interest, the interest is treated as passing from the
decedent to the spouse."" In both instances, the disclaimer must con-
stitute a complete and unqualified refusal to accept the rights to
which one is entitled; acceptance and subsequent disposal is not a
disclaimer.' 9 In the case of the third-party disclaimer the statute
requires that such action occur prior to the due date of the estate tax
return.20 As a practical matter, a disclaimer by a spouse should also
be made before that time. Otherwise, not only would an amended
return be necessary, but the delay in taking action might lead to a
conclusion that there had been an acceptance of the benefits conferred
upon the surviving spouse.
The ability to disclaim opens interesting avenues of post-mortem
estate planning. A disclaimer by the surviving spouse may lead to a
reduction in the amount of the deduction, thereby having the effect
of making the provision elective. In other instances, action on the
part of the spouse in rejecting certain dispositions may cause a re-
arranging of the component parts of the deduction. Such result would
obtain whenever a bequest to the spouse of an amount equal to the
maximum allowance is reduced by other dispositions to the spouse
and the spouse disclaims those other dispositions. Finally, renunci-
ation by a third person can produce an increased marital deduction
provided the disclaimed interest inures to the benefit of the surviving
spouse.
15§ 2041(a) (1), (2).
16S 2042.
'7 5 2056(d) (1).
18 5 2056(d) (2).
'9 5 2056(d) (2) (A); Reg. S 20.2056(d)-I(a) (1958).
s 5 2056(d) (2) (A).
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The Deductible Interest Requirement
We have already seen that no deduction can be had unless the
interest passing to the surviving spouse is included in the decedent's
gross estate. Nondeductibility is prescribed in three other instances:
(1) The passing of the interest from the decedent to the surviving
spouse gives rise to a deduction under Section 2053,21 as where the
property passes to the spouse in satisfaction of a claim of the spouse
against the estate.
(2) During settlement of the estate, the property interest becomes
the subject of a casualty loss deductible under Section 2054.2-
(3) The interest is a nondeductible terminable interest.28
The Nondeductible Terminable Interest Rule
The hallmark of community property is that each spouse has abso-
lute ownership of his or her share of the property with the result that
such share is taxed in the estate of the owner-spouse. Ultimately,
then, the entire interest becomes subject to estate tax, albeit in separate
estates. The nondeductible terminable interest rule is the means by
which Congress insures that interests qualifying for the marital deduc-
tion correspond to the interest of the surviving spouse in a community
property state.
A terminable interest in property is one which will terminate or
fail on the lapse of time or on the occurrence or nonoccurrence of
some event or contingency. 24 Such an interest becomes nondeductible
in either of two instances: (1) when some other interest in the same
property passes (for less than an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth) from the decedent to a third person who
may enjoy or possess the property after the termination or failure of
the interest passing to the surviving spouse;25 or (2) when pursuant
to directions of the decedent, a terminable interest is to be acquired
for the surviving spouse by decedent's executor or by the trustee of
a trust.2 6 Thus, the outright bequest of a patent owned by the
decedent gives the spouse a terminable interest inasmuch as the life
of the patent must end after a given period of years. Yet, the be-
quest qualifies for the marital deduction since no person other than
the spouse can possess or enjoy the interest after termination."7 On
the other hand, the devise of a life estate to the spouse with remainder
21 Reg. 5 20.2056(a)-2(b) (2) (1958).
22 Reg. 5 20.2056(a)-2(b) (3) (1958).
2
3 Reg. S 20. 2056(a)-2(b) (4) (1958).
24 S 2056(b) (1); Reg. S 20.2056(b)-l(b) (1958).
25S 2056(b) (1) (A), (B).
26S 2056(b) (1) (C).
27 Reg. § 20.2056(b)-1 (g) Ex. (6) (1958).
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over to another results in the passing of a nondeductible interest28 as
does the bequest of a sum of money with instructions to the executor
to use the funds to purchase an annuity for the spouse 2 9
One type of interest that has generated controversy with respect
to the terminable nature of the interest is the spouse's allowance
granted by many states during the administration of an estate. The
final say on the matter was had by the Supreme Court in Jackson v.
United States.0 The allowance will qualify provided the spouse has
an indefeasible right to it as of the date of the decedent's death. If
the right to the allowance can be cut off by the spouse's death or
remarriage, the interest is nondeductible.
Common law dower, being merely a life estate, constitutes a non-
qualifying terminable interest.31 However, if the spouse is given the
right to take a lump sum in lieu of dower and elects to do so, the
sum received counts toward the marital deduction.32 The same holds
true in the instance in which the spouse elects to receive the commuted
value of dower instead of dispositions made under the decedent's
willss and, too, where the dower claim results in a dispute as to the
spouse's right to dower and then in a settlement calling for outright
payment to the spouse3 4
Interest in Unidentified Assets
An extension of the terminable interest rule relates to situations in
which the assets out of which a bequest to the spouse can be satis-
fied include nondeductible interests. In such event, the statute has
the effect of treating the spouse as having received such interests,
thereby reducing the amount qualifying for the marital deduction.8 5
To illustrate, suppose a decedent bequeaths one-third of the resid-
uary estate to the surviving spouse. The property passing under the
decedent's will includes a leasehold interest reserved by the decedent
at the time a lifetime gift of the property was made to one other than
the spouse. If the value of the spouse's one-third interest in the
residuary is $100,000 and the value of the leasehold interest is $10,000,
the amount of the bequest qualifying for the deduction is reduced to
$90,000. This result can be avoided by an express provision in the
will prohibiting the use of nondeductible interests in the funding of
dispositions made for the benefit of the spouse.
SReg. § 20.2056(b)-1 (g) Ex. (1) (1958).
9 Reg. S 20.2056(b)-1 (g) Ex. (7) (1958).
90376 U.S. 503, 84 S.Ct. 869, 11 L.Ed. 2d 871 (1964).
81 The same is true of homestead exemptions that take the form of a life estate.
82 Kennedy v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 343 (D.S.C. 1969); Bradham v. United
States, 287 F. Supp. 10 (W.D. Ark. 1968); Rev. Rul. 72-153, 1972-IC.B. 309 (award
in lieu of homestead); Rev. Rul. 72-7, 1972-1 C.B. 308.
88 Hawaiian Trust Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d 1313 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
84 Rev. Rul. 66-139, 1966-1 C.B. 255.
35 S 2056(b) (2).
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Exception to the Terminable Interest Rule-Survivorship
for a Limited Period
A common will provision precludes a spouse from taking any por-
tions of the decedent's estate if; spouse and decedent die as the result of
a common disaster or under circumstances that make it impossible
to determine which of them was the first to die. Such a clause, with-
out more, would defeat the marital deduction with respect to prop-
erty passing under the will inasmuch as the presence of the provision
would convert the interests into nondeductible terminable interests.
Section 2056(b) (3) prevents this result by decreeing that an interest
will not be tainted by a requirement that the spouse survive the
decedent for a period not to exceed six months, or not die as a result
of common disaster, when, in fact, the failure condition does not
occur.
The Regulations take a hard line with respect to the exception,
making interests nondeductible if the surviving spouse's entitlement
thereto is conditional upon surviving some event other than death
within the prescribed period or as a result of a common disaster.8 6
Nevertheless, some cases have upheld deductibility on the ground that,
the will provision notwithstanding, local law vested the interest in-
defeasibly in the spouse at the moment of death.3 7
An interesting interplay between local law rules regarding simul-
taneous death and the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code con-
cerned with jointly held property is illustrated by Revenue Ruling
66-60.38 Pursuant to the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, if there
is no proof as to the order of death of joint tenants or tenants by the
entirety, the joint interest is distributed one-half as if one had sur-
vived and one-half as if the other had survived. Section 2040 requires
inclusion of jointly held property in the estate of the person furnish-
ing the consideration for the purchase; Section 2033 requires inclusion
of separately owned property in the estate of the owner. Thus, if
property held jointly by a husband and wife had been purchased with
funds provided solely by the husband, and the two die in a common
disaster, Section 2040 requires inclusion of the total value of the
property in the gross estate of the husband. But, at the same time,
the Simultaneous Death Act and Section 2033 mandate inclusion of
one-half the value of the property in the estate of the wife. Relief
is afforded by treating the latter portion as an interest passing from
36 Reg. S 20.2056(b)-3(b), (d) Ex. (4) (1958).
37E.g., Estate of Horton v. Comm'r, 388 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1967); Kellar v.
Kaspar, 138 F. Supp. 738 (D.S.D. 1956). It should be kept in mind that a state
court's declaration as to state law may not be binding in later litigation to resolve
a tax controversy. Comm'r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 87 S.Ct. 1754, 18
L.Ed.2d 886 (1967).
38 1966-1 C. 221.
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husband to wife, thereby allowing the interest to qualify for the
marital deduction.
Exception to the Terminable Interest Rule-Life Estate
with Power of Appointment
Virtual control rather than outright ownership furnishes the theme
for the second, and major exception to the nondeductible terminable
interest rule. Five conditions prescribed by Section 2056(b)(5) must
be met before a deduction can be secured under this exception:
(1) The surviving spouse must be entitled for life to all the income
from the entire interest or from a specific portion of the entire
interest, or to a specific portion of all the income from the entire
interest.
(2) The income must be payable annually or at more frequent
intervals.
(3) The surviving spouse must have the power to appoint the
entire interest, or the specific portion, in favor of the spouse or the
spouse's estate.
(4) The power in the surviving spouse must be exercisable by
the spouse alone and in all events.
(5) The entire interest or specific portion must not be subject to
a power in any other person to appoint any part to any person
other than the surviving spouse.
Income for Life Payable Annually
A surviving spouse is entitled to all of the income of a trust, or
to a specific portion thereof, if the effect of the trust is to give the
spouse substantially that degree of beneficial enjoyment of the trust
property during life which the principles of trust law accord a person
who is unqualifiedly designated as the life beneficiary of a trust.8 9
Direct restraints on" the spouse's right to income, e.g., the ability of
the trustee to accumulate income for the benefit of another, defeat
the deduction."
Indirect restrictions are not necessarily fatal. The critical question
is whether the overall effect of the trust accords the surviving spouse
such enforceable rights as will preserve for the spouse the requisite
degree of enjoyment.4' Therefore, disqualification is not an automatic
consequence of a provision requiring that stock dividends be treated
as corpus, or of one permitting the trustee to allocate receipts to
89Reg. 5 20.2056(b)-5(f)(1) (1958). A spouse possessing a legal life estate is
assumed to be entitled to all of the income therefrom. Difficulty may be en-
countered only if the property is unproductive.
4 0 Reg. S 20.2056(b)-5(f) (7) (1958).
41 Reg. S 20. 2056(b)-5(f) (2) (1958).
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income or corpus. 42 Neither will the deduction be lost because the
trustee has the power to retain investments, provided general stand-
ards of fiduciary administration require the trustee make the property
productive within a reasonable time. 8
We have seen that the income requirement of Section 2056(b)(5)
is satisfied if the spouse is entitled to all of the income from a specific
portion of the entire interest or to a specific portion of all the income
from the entire interest. Were the Government to have its way, no
partial interest would be considered a specific portion unless the rights
of the spouse in income could be expressed in terms of a fractional or
percentile share; annual income limited to a specific sum would not
constitute a deductible interest.4 4 This restrictive interpretation was
disapproved by the Supreme Court in Northeast Pennsylvania Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States,45 where the trust provided for
fixed dollar payments to the surviving spouse. (The spouse was also
given a general power of appointment over the entire corpus.) The
court predicated its rejection of the narrow view pressed by the
Service on the ground that it could find no indication that Congress
intended such a result, nor could it perceive any apparent connection
between the purposes underlying the deduction and such a limitation
on its availability.
If the surviving spouse is entitled to a fractional share of the in-
come, the deduction is limited to the same fractional value of the
corpus, provided the spouse's power of appointment over the princi-
pal is as extensive. Where the spouse is given a fixed dollar income
stipend, the deductible portion is determined by computing the
amount of corpus required to produce the fixed sum. 46
Power to Appoint to Self or Estate
Virtual control is achieved by coupling the spouse's life income
interest with a power to appoint the trust corpus to himself or her-
self or to his or her estate. This makes the power general, thereby
requiring inclusion of the principal in the gross estate of the surviving
spouse.4 7 However, it should be noted that a power to appoint to
one's creditors or to the creditors of one's estate, although a general
power,48 does not conform to the requirements of the exception.
A power of invasion or power to consume may constitute a power
of appointment that satisfies the statute. For this to be so, the sur-
viving spouse must have the unrestricted power, exercisable at any
42 Reg. 5 20.2056(b)-5(f) (3), (4) (1958); Rev. Rul. 69-56. 1969-1 C.B. 224.
4 S Reg. S 20.2056(b)-5 (f) (4) (1958); Rev. Rul. 66-39, 1966-1 C.B. 223.44 Reg. S 20.2056(b)-5(c) (1958).
45 387 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 1573, 18 L.Ed. 2d 726 (1967).46 This is not the same thing as computing the present value of the right to the
specific payments over an actuarially determined life expectancy.
47 § 2041 (b) (1).
48 Id.
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time during life, to use all or any part of the property subject to the
power, and to dispose of it in any manner, including the power to
dispose of it by gift.49 The difficulty in qualifying a power to con-
sume as a Section 2056(b)(5) power is best illustrated by Estate
of Pipe v. Commn'r,5° where the spouse was given a legal life estate
with
"full power to use, enjoy, sell or dispose of the income and princi-
pal thereof ... for such purposes or in such manner, as she in her
uncontrolled discretion may choose, it being my desire to place no
restraint on her in any respect concerning the absolute right of full
disposition and use of the whole or any part of said income or
principal ...except that she shall have no power over the dispo-
sition of such part thereof as remains unexpended at the time of
her death."
The Second Circuit denied the deduction for the reason that the
spouse lacked the necessary power as any corpus remaining at death
went to others. Such result would not obtain under the present state
of the law since the Regulations now provide that a power to con-
sume can qualify whether or not the spouse has the power to dispose
of the interest by will.!,'
Whether a particular will provision constitutes an unlimited power
to invade often calls for resort to rules of local law regarding the
scope of the power. On occasion, principles of applicable state law
have converted a broadly worded invasion clause from one that is
seemingly unlimited into one exercisable only in good faith to meet
the needs of the surviving spouse.52
If the surviving spouse has the requisite power, possession of one
or more lesser powers, is of no moment. Thus, an unlimited power
to withdraw can be coupled with a limited testamentary power; a
power to appoint to one's estate can be joined by a limited power to
invade. 53
The spouse's power of appointment can extend to the entire in-
terest or just to a specific portion. Yet unanswered is whether, for
this purpose, the specific portion must be a fractional or percentile
share of the corpus.54
Power Exercisable Alone and in All Events
A power fails to meet the requirements of Section 2056(b) (5) unless
49 Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5 (g) (3) (1958).
50 241 F.2d 210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 335 U.S. 814 (1957).
51 Reg. S 20.2056(b)-5(g) (3) (1958).
52 E.g., Comm'r v. Estate of Ellis, 252 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1958).
53 Reg. § 20.2056 (b)-5 (g) (1958); Rev. Rul. 72-154, 1972-2 C.B. 310.
54 The Supreme Court has called this question a "difficult matter." North-
eastern Pennsylvania Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 387 U.S. 213, 225,
87 S.Ct. 1573, 1580, 18 L.Ed. 2d 726, 734 (1967).
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it is exercisable by the surviving spouse without the consent of any
person and in all events. Unconditional exercise is the sine qua non
of the all events test. Thus, a power is not exercisable in all events if
it can be terminated during the life of the surviving spouse by an
event other than complete exercise or release, as in the case of a power
that cannot be exercised after remarriage. 55 In like fashion, the all
events test is failed if the power can be exercised for a limited pur-
pose only, e.g., a power to consume to the extent necessary to support
the surviving spouse.56
A power is not exercisable in all events unless it can be exercised
immediately after the decedent's death.57 Thus, the power does not
qualify if it cannot be effectively exercised before distribution of
estate assets by the executor. 5 Bui if the power is immediately exer-
cisable, a delay in distribution pending completion of administration
does not defeat the deduction. 59
There is no requirement that the spouse have the ability to exercise
the power both during life and by will. What is required is that a
power exercisable during life be exercisable at all times during the
spouse's life and that one exercisable by will be exercisable irrespective
of the time of the spouse's death.60
No Power in Another to Appoint to Others
The final condition mandates that no one other than the surviving
spouse have a power to appoint the trust corpus to a person other
than the spouse. This does not preclude the decedent from granting
another the power to appoint in favor of the spouse,61 nor does it
prevent the decedent from providing for takers in default of the
spouse's exercise of the power. 2
The Estate Trust
A unique way of preserving the marital deduction without giving
the surviving spouse absolute ownership of the interest is by the
creation of an estate trust. In essence, such a trust is nothing more
than a bequest of income to the spouse for life or for a term of years
followed by a remainder to the spouse's estate, or the accumulation
of trust income and the payment of the accumulated fund and corpus
55 Reg. S 20.2056(b)-5(g)(3) (1958); Cf. Starrett v. Comm'r, 223 F.2d 163 (1st
Cir. 1955).
5 6 Reg. S 20.2056(b)-5 (g) (3) (1958).
57 Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5 (g) (4) (1958).
58Id.
591d.
60 Reg. 5 20.2056(b)-5 (g) (1) (i), (ii) (1958).
61 Reg. S 20.2056(b)-5(j) (1958).
62 Reg. S 20.2056(b)-5(j) Ex. (1) (1958).
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to the spouse's estate. 63 The disposition qualifies for the deduction
since no one other than the spouse or the spouse's estate takes any
interest in the property passing from the decedent to the surviving
spouse. Because of this, the trust does not have to satisfy the five-
fold test prescribed for the life estate with power of appointment
exception. Thus, the estate trust can be funded with unproductive
or underproductive assets without jeopardizing the deduction.
Exception to the Terminable Interest Rule-Life Insurance
with Power of Appointment
The last exception to the nondeductible terminable interest rule,
Section 2056(b)(6), becomes operative when proceeds of a life in-
surance policy, an endowment policy or an annuity policy are left
with the insurer under an arrangement whereby the spouse is entitled
to receive the proceeds in installments or interest on the proceeds
during life, and has a power of appointment over any balance remain-
ing at death. The provision has no application if the proceeds come
into the hands of a trustee other than the insurer. In such case, de-
ductibility is dependent upon meeting the conditions imposed by
Section 2056(b) (5).
The requirements of the insurance exception are not unlike the
fivefold test prescribed for the life estate-power of appointment ex-
ception. As set forth in the Regulations:64
(1) The proceeds, or a specific portion of the proceeds, must be
held by the insurer subject to an agreement to pay the entire proceeds
or a specific portion thereof in installments, or to pay interest there-
on, and all or a specific portion of the installments or interest payable
during the life of the surviving spouse must be payable only to the
spouse.
(2) The installments or interest payable to the surviving spouse
must be payable annually or more frequently, comniencing not later
than 13 months after the decedent's death.
(3) The surviving spouse must have the power to appoint all or a
specific portion of the amounts held by the insurer to himself or her-
self or to his or her estate.
(4) The power in the surviving spouse must be exercisable by the
spouse alone and (whether exercisable by will or during life) must
be exercisable in all events.
(5) The amounts or the specific portion of the amounts payable
under the agreement must not be subject to a power in any other
person to appoint any part thereof to any person other than the
surviving spouse.
63Reg. 5 20,2056(e)-2(b)(1)(i)-(iii) (1958); Rev. Rul. 72-333, 1972-2 C.B. 530;
Rev. Rul. 68-554, 1968-2 C.B. 412.
e4 Reg. A 20.2056(b)-6(a) (1958).
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One difference between the insurance exception and Section 2056
(b) (5) is the requirement that payments commence within 13 months
of the decedent's death. No such condition is imposed when deduc-
tion is sought under the life estate with power of appointment ex-
ception. A second difference relates to the definition of specific
portion. Here the Regulations concede that a specific dollar amount
of proceeds may be the ecquivalent of a definite or fixed percentage
of the total proceeds.65 Finally, the term "power of appointment"
need not be used in the trust, it being sufficient that the contract gives
the spouse a right which is, in substance and effect, a power to appoint
to self or estate. 66
Limitations on the Allowable Deduction
The Maximum Deduction
Deduction under Section 2056 is limited to one-half the decedent's
adjusted gross estate, that is, one-half of the gross estate less the deduc-
tions for debts, expenses and taxes allowed by Section 2033 and the
deduction for casualty losses permitted by Section 2054.67 (The
charitable deduction has no effect on the determination of the ad-
justed gross estate.) This limitation sets the maximum allowance; it
does not insure a deduction in that amount, for in no event can the
deduction exceed the value of the deductible interests passing to the
surviving spouse.
Valuation of the Interests Passing to the Survising Spouse
In general the assets passing to the surviving spouse take the same
values ascribed to them in computing the decedent's gross estate,
namely, date of death values or alternate valuation date values. How-
ever, Section 2056(b)(4) imposes two special rules concerning valu-
ation. The first of these requires a consideration of the effect of death
taxes on the net value of the interests passing to the surviving spouse.
The second involves the manner in which interests subject to encum-
brances are to be taken into account in determining the extent of the
deduction.
If the provisions of the will or of applicable state law place no
burden of federal or state death taxes on the interests passing to the
surviving spouse, the entire value of such interests qualifies for the
marital deduction. On the other hand, if estate and inheritance taxes
are payable out of the share to which the spouse is entitled, the de-
duction is reduced by the effect which such payment has on the
amount to be received by the spouse. Determination of this effect
5 Reg. S 20.2056(b)-6(c) (1) (1958).
G Reg. § 20.2056(b)-6(e) (4) (1958).
67 § 2056(c)(1), (2)(A). Section 2056(c) (2) (B) sets forth a special rule for
determining the adjusted gross estate where community property is involved.
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involves a double unknown. The amount of death taxes depends on
the size of the marital deduction; the amount of the marital deduc-
tion depends on the taxes to be paid.
Downward adjustment is also required whenever an interest passing
to the spouse is subject to an encumbrance (as in the case of a devise
of real property encumbered by a mortgage with respect to which
the decedent was personally liable),68 A similar reduction in the value
of the spouse's interest is called for when the disposition in favor of
the spouse is conditioned upon the spouse assuming an obligation. But
no adjustment is called for if the terms of the decedent's will or the
provisions of local law require an exoneration of the encumbrance
or obligation out of other assets of the decedent's estate. (Although
the statute seemingly operates in this instance, the Regulations pro-
vide that payment of the obligation by the executor constitutes an
additional interest passing to the surviving spouse, thereby restoring
the interest to its original value.)0 9
Pecuniary Bequests and Revenue Procedure 64-19
It is settled law that the satisfaction of a pecuniary bequest with
appreciated assets results in the realization of gain to the estate. As a
means of preventing this result, many decedents in the past included
a provision authorizing the executor to satisfy bequests in kind at the
value finally determined for federal estate tax purposes. A side con-
sequence of such a provision was the ability of the executor to fund
a pecuniary bequest in favor of the surviving spouse with assets that
depreciated in value from the time they were valued for tax purposes,
resulting in the spouse receiving less than the amount for which a
deduction had been claimed. This possibility is now barred by the
existence of Revenue Procedure 64-19.70
The basic thrust of Revenue Procedure 64-19 is the loss of the
marital deduction whenever a pecuniary bequest to or for the benefit
of the spouse can be satisfied in kind by assets valued at the value
reported for estate tax purposes, and the executor has discretion to
choose the assets used to fund the bequest. However, the deduction
is saved if the applicable local law or the terms of the decedent's will
require a distribution of assets having an aggregate fair market value on
the date or dates of distribution amounting to no less than the amount
of the pecuniary bequest, or of assets that are fairly representative
of appreciation or depreciation in the value of all property available
for distribution in satisfaction of the pecuniary bequest.
68 If the decedent was not personally liable on the mortgage, there would be
no adjustment since the property would be included in the decedent's gross estate
at its net value, not its full value.
69 Reg. S 20.2056(b)-4(b) (1958).
TO 1964-1 (Pt. 1) C.B. 682. Query, whether local law principles of fiduciary ad-
ministration have not always precluded the result.
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The device that triggers Revenue Procedure 64-19 is the pecuniary
bequest, whether expressed in terms of a fixed dollar amount or as a
formula, e.g., an amount equal to one-half of the adjusted gross estate.
Thus, it has no application in the case of specific bequests and devises
or dispositions of fractional shares of the decedent's residuary estate.
Nor does it decree disallowance if the pecuniary bequest must be
satisfied in cash, or if the executor has no discretion in the choice of
assets that may be distributed, or if the executor is required to use
distribution date values in valuing the assets used to fund the bequest.

